This paper presents the development and implementation of techniques used to manage autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) performing 24/7 persistent surveillance operations. Using an indoor flight testbed, flight test results are provided to demonstrate the complex issues encountered by operators and mission managers when executing an extended persistent surveillance operation in realtime. This paper presents mission health monitors aimed at identifying and improving mission system performance to avoid down time, increase mission system efficiency and reduce operator loading. This paper discusses the infrastructure needed to execute an autonomous persistent surveillance operation and presents flight test results from one of our recent automated UAV recharging experiments. Using the RAVEN at MIT, we present flight test results from a 24 hr, fully-autonomous air vehicle flight-recharge test and an autonomous, multi-vehicle extended mission test using small, electric-powered air vehicles.
I. Introduction
Today, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are used to aid in search and rescue, surveillance, and other missions over a variety of locations throughout the world. Teams of multiple UAVs can provide valuable information to operators that can be used to make mission critical decisions in real-time. These vehicle task groups offer a promising alternative to a number of high-risk manned mission scenarios. In addition, multi-agent teams can be used to perform round-the-clock missions in dangerous and unknown environments without considerable risk to the human operators.
However, one of the main problems with any air operation is the coordination of resources when operations require a persistent capability over the desired operational area. Though the arrival time of replacement vehicles to a task location is important in such missions, the maintenance and operator support systems also play an equal role in ensuring that assets are readily available if needed in an emergency situation.
In principle, many questions related to the timing and upkeep of such systems are very similar to many questions arising in manufacturing. For example, the problem of scheduling machine main-tenance in between production runs is a common scheduling problem found in the manufacturing world. 1, 2 Likewise, scheduling and maintenance problems have been explored with respect to air transportation and the airline industry to reduce delay time and operating costs due to external disruptions in flight plans (i.e., weather conditions, mechanical failures). 3, 4 On the other hand, Refs. 5 and 6 incorporate maintenance considerations into the vehicle routing problem to lower routing and operating costs while meeting scheduled maintenance constraints.
Though many of the issues presented in these papers apply to problems related to scheduling concerns, some of the challenges specific to persistent operations include (but are not limited to):
several multi-agent teams may be operating simultaneously that may or may not coordinate tasks and information about the current task, vehicle assets may be lost during the course of a mission, and little or no information about the vehicles may be directly available to the operator during the mission. For example, a vehicle failure may become known only after the vehicle has failed to show up for refuelling past a given deadline.
A number of researchers have explored persistent UAV operations. For example, in Ref. 7 , researchers demonstrated video surveillance over an area using two fixed-wing UAVs, while in Ref. 8 describes techniques for using multiple UAVs to explore regions for ground objects of interest.
Similar missions have been studied as part of the DARPA Sponsored MICA (Mixed Initiative Control of Automa-Teams) project which focused on the use of multiple vehicle teams to accomplish discrete mission tasks. [9] [10] [11] These papers focus on asset allocation and mission management during flight operations.
Though many papers discuss how to perform the operations using aerial platforms, the purpose of this paper is to discuss the development and implementation of techniques used to manage autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) performing long-term (24/7) persistent surveillance operations. This paper presents mission health monitors aimed at identifying and improving mission system performance to avoid down time, increase mission system efficiency and reduce operator loading. Using an indoor multi-vehicle testbed presented in Refs. 12 and 13, this paper will present the infrastructure used to execute an autonomous persistent surveillance operation over a 24-hr period and show flight test results from recent automated persistent surveillance missions and UAV recharging experiments.
II. Simplified Persistent Surveillance Mission
To understand the issues related to a long-term persistent surveillance mission, we begin by investigating questions related to a smaller group of vehicles with a centralized task manager and a single surveillance task requiring a vehicle on-site for an extended period of time. In this problem, the major underlying assumption is that all vehicles are not expendable. As a result, the main goal of the mission system is to ensure that not only is a persistent presence maintained over the target area, but also that each vehicle is returned to the base location safely. Therefore, first, consider a collection of M agents of the same capability and a single surveillance location. This problem setup provides a simplified resource management problem for which we can find a tractable solution for the task assignment and agent task scheduling problem under simplified assumptions.
Next, assume that a vehicle's availability is based on its current health state. As discussed in Ref. 14, the term "health management" was used in the past to define systems which actively monitored and managed vehicle sub-systems (e.g., flight controls, fuel management, avionics) in the event of component failures. 15 This definition can be extended to the context of multiple vehicle operations and autonomous multi-agent teams. In this case, teams involved in a mission serve as a "vehicle system." Then, each multi-agent team involved in the mission is a sub-system to the larger mission team. In addition, each vehicle is a sub-system of each multi-agent team, and so on. As with mission-critical systems for a single agent, multi-agent task allocation and mission management systems must account for vehicle-and system-level health-related issues to ensure that these systems are cost effective to operate over the duration of a mission. While this problem may be formulated as a very large mathematical programming problem, this approach is likely to be computationally intractable for any computer or human operator to solve in real-time (even for a problem of reasonable size).
At the vehicle level, many aspects related to a vehicle's current performance and capabilities can be considered as part of this state. For example, battery charge, sensor capabilities, and motor wear play a large role in an electric vehicle's capability to perform a mission. To simplify this problem, assume that the vehicle's remaining flight time will denote the vehicle's health state. In addition, assume that the all of the vehicles have the same capabilities (e.g., all vehicles can only be used for surveillance) and leave from the same location.
Finally, assume that each vehicle is subject to failures (independent of other vehicles) during flight operations. Let p define the probability of a fuel failure, which is constant for all time t (for simplicity). In this problem formulation, assume that a fuel failure means the vehicle must immediately return to the base to prevent a loss of vehicle.
In the task allocation and scheduling problems, assume that the agent allocation remains fixed during the interval of observation (which are length T for now). In each interval, let the symbol where n i ∈ Z + indicate the number of flights by each vehicle. In reality, since repeated use of the vehicle usually means that the vehicle is more prone to a failure, the tasking system should seek to minimize the number of flight hours on each vehicle. Therefore, the solution to the simplified persistent scheduling problem will be a function Z, H, and N .
A. Simplified Problem Setup
Given the above information, we can pose the simplified persistent surveillance mission resource management problem as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). First, define the state as the vector (Z, H, N ). Next, define the actions A on the same space as Z, where A indicates the new mission group configuration. Note that only agents which have returned-to-base can be re-allocated to a new task group. Next, a state (Z, H, N ) will transition under action A to state (Ā,H,N ) with probability P A ((Z, H, N ), (Ā,H,N )). In this problem vehicles can experience failures which cause them to be unavailable for use (because of fuel and maintenance concerns). In this case, instead of transitioning to state (A,H,N ) the system may transition to another state (Ā,H,N ) if an agent is no longer able to perform its duties due to a fuel issue or failure. Finally, let g A (Z, H, N ) represent the single-stage cost for being in state (Z, H, N ) under action A.
III. Resource Manager and Approximate Linear Programming Problem Formulation
Now that all of the parameters have been specified, we can formulate and solve the mission management problem using optimization methods like Dynamic Programming. 1 In some cases, we can find the optimal policy using the value function generated from solving the dynamic program.
However, as the number of vehicles added to the mission increases, the size of the state and action space increases quickly. In fact, it is very difficult to find a solution to this problem in real-time using Dynamic Programming since the size of the state and action space in this problem grows very rapidly as the number of vehicles increase. As a result, it becomes difficult to find the optimal solution for even the centralized resource allocation problem in real-time for scenarios with a large number of vehicles. Therefore, using approximation techniques we may be able to find a feasible policy which meets our mission goals.
One option is to use an Approximate Linear Programming formulation of the problem to find a feasible policy for multiple vehicle, multiple task scenarios. In order to use this approach, we must first formulate the original Dynamic Programming problem as a Linear Program. Notice that since
we can write the problem in the following form:
where c is the state relevance weights for the problem. To ensure that there is a unique optimal solution to this problem, we must ensure that c > 0. Therefore, we can write:
This is called the Exact Linear Programming problem. Next, using the basis functions φ 1 , ...φ B , we can approximate J ≈ Φr. Then, we can re-write Eq. (1) as: max c T Φr subject to T Φr ≥ Φr or in other words:
This is the Approximate Linear Programming (ALP) formulation of the original Dynamic Programming problem. 16, 17 The benefit to this approach is that using the Basis Function Generation
Algorithm provided in Ref. 13 to find set of B basis functions where J * ≈ Φr * and B << |S|, then this approach can be used to find an approximate solution to the original mission management problem that will provide us with a "good" policy in much less time. Note that we define a "good"
policy as a policy that allocates enough vehicles to each task location to meet the mission task goal, while managing the health situation of each vehicle.
IV. Mission Planning and Vehicle Health Monitoring
In planning and monitoring the persistent surveillance mission, the automated task manager must be able to assess the status of the vehicles to determine whether a failure has occurred during the flight. Most persistent surveillance mission models make the assumption that the remaining flight time for a vehicle is known or decays in a well-defined way. However, this assumption does not hold in many cases. For example, small electric-powered UAVs are powered by batteries. Since these batteries are charged and discharged over time, they decay at different rates. This rate of battery decay can change based on the type of vehicle that is used, how the battery is stressed during vehicle use, the charger used to re-charge the battery, the temperature of the environment, and many other characteristics. Therefore, one cannot assume that every electric-powered vehicle with a fully-charged battery will be able to sustain a specific flight time without considering at least some of the other information provided.
For this reason, knowing the current health state of the vehicle can improve the performance of the overall mission system. Therefore, in order to automate persistent surveillance missions, two additional components are required: 1) vehicle health monitoring -and more specifically, a fuel or battery health monitor, and 2) an automatic vehicle maintenance and refueling / recharging station. In the next two sections, we will describe the methods used to implement these features to automate a persistent surveillance mission.
V. Battery Health Monitoring
As mentioned earlier, the RAVEN was constructed to study, implement and analyze the performance of techniques for embedding the fleet and vehicle health state into UAV mission planning. 12 Past research into battery monitoring and state estimation has focused on using direct, invasive measurements of current flow and voltage level to calculate a battery's state of charge (SOC). Most of this research focuses on calculating SOC using complex analytical models of internal battery dynamics. 21, 22 However, these approaches require significant knowledge of battery properties and internal dynamics. Recent research has sought to simplify the construction of battery SOC models by using machine learning techniques using voltage and current measurements from the battery. 23 A learning approach can be advantageous because it does not require knowledge of internal battery chemistry and can be easily extended to multiple battery chemistries.
As part of this research activity, the relationships between a vehicle's flight capabilities, power system health, propeller wear, battery charge and other parameters are being examined using the electric-powered quadrotor vehicles in the RAVEN. 12, 14 Flight testing has demonstrated that many of these parameters can be evaluated while observing the vehicle in a simple hover. For example, data from these flight tests has shown there is a strong correlation between the battery voltage and the R/C controller's collective stick position value. As the voltage of the battery decreases over time (due to battery use), the collective stick command increases. Typical results for the X-UFO and a Draganflyer with both the white plastic and black nylon blades and are shown in Figure 1 . Note that the Draganflyer's new stock black nylon blades using a 2000 mAh battery produce slightly higher collective commands than the older white plastic blades (which were very brittle and cracked easily), but yield similar shaped collective command curves over the vehicle's flight time (as shown in Figure 1 ). Note that for each quadrotor, the collective command increases rapidly initially during take-off and steadily increases almost linearly until the vehicle's battery begins to lose charge rapidly near the end of the flight.
Since our goal is to command and control multiple air vehicles over extended time periods, a 
VI. Battery Charging Station
Even as electric-powered autonomous vehicles and their support systems become smarter, they are fundamentally limited by the capacity of their onboard batteries. As described in the section above, autonomous health management hardware and software allow vehicles to determine the battery's current status and decide when a vehicle must land to replace its batteries or recharge itself before continuing its mission. In previous research, ground platforms have been developed to allow ground robots to recharge during operations. For example, at the University of Tsukuba, researchers constructed an autonomous ground vehicle and recharge system in order to facilitate autonomous ground vehicle navigation and control experiments. 24 The system was tested by running an autonomous vehicle nonstop for one week. During the week-long experiment, over one thousand recharge dockings were successfully accomplished. However, as of the writing of this paper, we have not found an instance of an autonomous aerial docking and recharge before reporting it in Ref. 12.
Therefore, to conduct research into autonomous, multi-vehicle, persistent surveillance mission applications, an integrated autonomous recharge landing platform and system was designed. Shown in Figure 2 , the goal of this system is to allow our aerial vehicles to autonomously recharge their batteries during extended flight operations. This recharge platform provides real-time information on the charge progress of the battery. This information can be used by the mission manager to monitor and estimate the vehicle's current health state during the charge process. The real-time battery data gathered during the recharge process and flight operations can be used to estimate the vehicle's projected flight time. This data provides a second estimate that can be used to predict when a vehicle should be cycled back to base during mission operations.
The recharge system consists of several components: battery isolation electronics, vehicle electrical contacts, landing pad, and ground recharge electronics. While this system is designed to recharge quadrotor vehicles, the electronics and software in the system can be adapted to other vehicle types, such as ground rovers and other R/C vehicles. In addition, the battery isolation electronics are used to prevent power-related issues during vehicle arrival to or departure from the recharge station. Finally, contact pads on the body of the quadrotor provide the necessary electrical contact to recharge the battery on board the vehicles. As shown in Figure 3 , each leg (labeled 1 to 4 in the figure) of the quadrotor is outfitted with copper contacts. Electrical tape is used to insulate all contact pads from the carbon fiber quadrotor body. Note that in this figure the Draganflyer has a board attached to it between the pins and the recharger. This electronic setup allows the Draganflyer to be reactivated (i.e., toggle the Draganflyer's safety push button) after vehicle power has been turned on.
Once the vehicle lands in the charger, the vehicle's battery is usually warm from use during flight. As the battery cools, our testing has shown that the battery's voltage will rebound from its "motor's off" state. As shown in Figure batteries are given a chance to cool down. Therefore, before we start recharging the batteries, we allow the battery to cool down for 5 mins to allow the batteries to reach a steady state before charging. Additional long-term testing is needed to better quantify battery life and the effect of starting a charge cycle early.
As with the vehicle when it is flying, we can use the battery's current and voltage measurements on the charger to both estimate the vehicle's remaining charge time and estimated flight time. we are able to end the charge cycle earlier to reduce the flight-maintenance cycle of the battery.
However, additional long-term testing is needed to better quantify battery life and the effect of ending a charge cycle early using the current vehicle recharge system.
Using this setup, the system has autonomously commanded a vehicle to take-off, fly a small mission, and then land in the recharge platform. Then, the system autonomously commands recharge platform to charge vehicle's battery, while monitoring its progress throughout the charge cycle. After the charging sequence has been completed, the system re-initializes the vehicle and 
VII. Mission Flight Test Results
Following this test, the system was setup to perform a second autonomous multi-vehicle mission test. In this test, the mission manager calculated the best policy using basis functions generated by the Basis Function Generation Algorithm in Ref. 13 . Figure 7 shows the test setup where there In this test, each X-UFO was outfitted with a recharging station, and each Draganflyer was setup for the operator to change the batteries manually. The main reason for this test setup is as follows. Each battery using the automatic recharging platform takes approximately 70-90 mins to complete a recharge cycle (the five minute cool down period plus battery charging time due to flight use). Since only five vehicles (two Draganflyers and three X-UFOs) were available for the test, each vehicle had no more than 60-70 mins to complete its recharge before having to take-off again to perform surveillance -assuming that there are no vehicle failures or problems during the flight.
Therefore, it was decided that the batteries for the two Draganflyer vehicles would be manually changed during the test, while the three X-UFOs would use the automatic recharging stations to recharge their batteries. In addition, the flight times for both Draganflyer vehicles varied based on the condition of the vehicle system. For example, since these vehicles had been flown many times before this test, the number of flight hours on each vehicle varied between 7 and 13 mins with different batteries. Likewise, each X-UFO during testing also showed variations in flight time for new batteries. Therefore, different battery monitors were used for each vehicle and vehicle type. In this test, the mission manager's primary goal was to maintain one vehicle in the southern end of the room for surveillance purposes at all times. Since the vehicles had varying recharging and flight times, the problem formulation was adjusted to place a lower cost on using Draganflyers when they were available (since the batteries could be changed by the operator) and to always ensure that at least one vehicle was commanded to the surveillance area. For this problem, the state x ∈ S is defined as the vector x = (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 , z 5 , h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , h 4 , h 5 ), where z i indicates the task to which each agent is allocated, h i indicates each agent's maintenance/health state, and S is the state space for the problem. In addition to these states, a "demonstration end" state O ∈ S was added to this particular mission management problem setup to ensure that when the flight demonstration was over, the mission manager would command all of the vehicles back to base with probability one. Next, each action a ∈ A x is defined as the vector a = (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 ) where a i indicates the system's desired allocation for agent in the task space and A x is the action space associated with the state x ∈ S. Each state x will transition under action a to the future state y ∈ S with probability P a (x, y). Note that the agents in this problem can experience failures that cause them to be unavailable. In addition, agents are available for flight operations for a limited period of time (because of fuel, failure and maintenance concerns).
Finally, a local cost for being in state x under action a is defined by the function g a (x) ∈ R.
The cost for this problem was setup to penalize the system for not having a vehicle airborne and for having more than one vehicle airborne in the surveillance area at any given time. The idea behind this cost is that when the vehicles are cycling in and out, one vehicle is waiting on the other.
Therefore, once the other vehicle is in the surveillance area, the second vehicle will be leavingand hence, not performing surveillance. In addition, to promote a pro-active health strategy, the system was penalized for having vehicles in the surveillance area in a warning health state. In this problem, there were four health states: good, fair, warning, and maintenance. A good health state was associated with a good battery with at least 3 mins of flight time remaining. A fair health state was associated with a battery with between 3 and 1.5 mins of flight time remaining.
A warning health state was associated with under 1.5 mins of battery life and the the maintenance state represented the vehicle in recharge / maintenance. Finally, a cost penalty was added to actions where the system selects a "good" X-UFO over "good" Draganflyer from the base location to fly to the surveillance area. The reason for this penalty was to encourage the system to cycle Draganflyers more often, thereby giving the X-UFOs enough recharge time on the recharge pads in between flights. Using this problem formulation, the basis function generation algorithm in Ref. 13 was used to generate the multipliers that were used by the mission manager to generate the approximation of the cost-to-go function for this problem in real-time.
Using this cost structure with the battery monitors described above, a 1.5 hour persistent surveillance mission with five vehicles was setup in the laboratory. Just as in the previous 1.5 hour test, the mission system was responsible for commanding the vehicles to take-off fly to the surveillance location and back. However, in this test, three of the vehicles were designed to autonomously recharge, while two of the vehicles needed an operator maintenance action upon landing in the same manner as the previous test. The three X-UFO vehicles were fully-autonomous throughout the demonstration, and the Draganflyer vehicles used in the demonstration were fully-autonomous with the exception of the operator action to change out their batteries after landing.
Data from this test is shown in Figures 8 and 9 . During the 90 min test, there were multiple vehicle failures. As shown in Figure 9 , Vehicle 1x was commanded to take-off twice over the 90 min test, but the vehicle had trouble leaving the recharging station and never was able to take-off during the entire test. The first time Vehicle 1x was commanded to take-off occurred at 55 mins when Vehicle 1x was commanded to take over for Vehicle 2d because it was unresponsive to the mission manager command. Since Vehicle 2d was not re-activated (due to operator error after the vehicle's battery was replaced), the vehicle never left the base area when commanded. After Vehicle 1x failed the first time, the mission manager commanded Vehicle 2x to take Vehicle 1d's place. However, since the mission manager was proactively commanding vehicles to replace flying vehicles based on their estimated remaining flight time, it commanded vehicles to take-off early enough such that the vehicle failures at the base station and air vehicle problems due to unexpected flight-related issues only resulted in a 10 sec gap in coverage. At approximately 63 mins into the test, Vehicle 2d
was reactivated by the operator and tested to make sure that it could take-off using the operator's manual override. Next, at approximately 68 mins into the test, Vehicle 2x's battery alarm detected a low-battery condition causing the vehicle to come back to base earlier than expected. Since this failure was not expected and due to an unexpected vehicle issue, the mission manager reactively caused Vehicle 1d to take-off and replace it in the surveillance area -resulting in a 30 sec gap in surveillance coverage. Finally, at approximately 90 mins Vehicle 1x was commanded a second time to take-off in order to replace Vehicle 2d, however once again, it was unable to clear the ground recharge platform. Hence, the mission manager commanded Vehicle 1d to fly in its place (since its battery was replaced by the operator less than a minute earlier). Since the mission manager was able to command Vehicle 1d before Vehicle 2d's battery alarm reached the warning state, there was no loss in coverage due to this failure.
Overall, even with all of the vehicle issues that occurred during the test, there was approximately a 40 sec gap in coverage after the first vehicle reached the surveillance area, resulting in over 99% coverage during the test. As seen in Figure 8 , the policy generated using the basis function algorithm's cost-to-go function performed well despite all of the ensuing failures. This test marked the first time in the literature that a basis function generation method has been used to manage resources in a real-time, hardware-based autonomous system.
After performing this 1.5 hr test, the same mission manager was used to manage a 6 hour persistent surveillance mission with the same five vehicles in the laboratory. Just as in the 1.5 hour test above, the mission system was responsible for commanding the vehicles to take-off fly to the surveillance location and back. Once again, three of the vehicles were designed to autonomously recharge, while two of the vehicles needed an operator maintenance action upon landing in the same manner as the previous test.
Data from this test is shown in Figures 10 and 11 . Once again, there were multiple vehicle failures during the 375 min test. As shown in Figure 11 , at approximately 25 mins into the test, Vehicle 3x was commanded to take-off, but the vehicle failed and did not leave the recharging station. In fact, this failure resulted in the loss of the vehicle for the entire test. Therefore, the system commanded vehicle Vehicle 1x to fly in its place. In addition, at about 40 mins into the test, the Vicon positioning system's Tarsus software froze unexpectedly. This caused the hovering Vehicle 2d to fall out of the air and crash. It took the operator approximately 2.6 mins to reinitialize the Vicon system and retrieve the crashed air vehicle. After the system came back up, the mission system tried to command vehicle Vehicle 2d back to the air, but instead commanded Vehicle 1d after Vehicle 2d was deemed unresponsive (since the operator was repairing it from the crash). In addition, small gaps in coverage occurred due to battery alarms, other vehicle failures, and air vehicle's taking alternate flight paths to avoid an incoming vehicle to base.
Overall, even with all of the vehicle issues that occurred during this span of time, there was approximately a 5.83 min gap in coverage after the first vehicle reached the surveillance area, resulting in over 98.4% coverage during the 6 hr test. As seen in Figure 10 , the policy generated using the basis function algorithm's cost-to-go function performed well despite all of the ensuing failures. This test once again showed that the basis function generation method was capable of being used to generate policies that could manage resources in a real-time, hardware-based autonomous system. In addition, to the best of our knowledge this is the longest autonomous multi-vehicle air vehicle mission where an autonomous aerial docking and recharge was used to maintenance vehicles autonomously in the literature. The flight tests in this section mark a large step in the development of on-line cost approximation structures used to manage autonomous systems in real-time.
VIII. Conclusion
In summary, health management techniques can be used to improve mission-level functional reliability through better system self-awareness and adaptive mission planning. The paper presents
results and examples that demonstrate how health management information is being used to improve the mission system's self-awareness and adapt vehicle, guidance, task and mission plans so that an autonomous mission manager can command and control multiple autonomous UAVs over extended time periods. These algorithms, which determine the health of each mission component in real-time, have been successfully implemented and tested. In addition, these algorithms were used in part with vehicle maintenance hardware to enable the first fully-autonomous flight-recharge 24 hr test by a single vehicle. These, and other health management algorithms for each component, have been shown to improve strategic and tactical level decision making in autonomous mission systems while observing the impact of likely failures and maintenance needs for extended mission scenarios.
